The Other Side of Limited Liability: Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing by Christian Bayer
The Other Side of Limited Liability:
Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing
￿rst Version: February 5, 2002




This paper investigates the interplay of investment irreversibility, predatory behavior, and limited
liability in a duopoly with aggregate demand uncertainty. We ￿nd that limited liability and
investment irreversibility is likely to produce predatory behavior in very competitive industries in
which prices react strongly to changes in quantity and capacity increases are not too costly.
The rationale for this may be summarized as follows: Under limited liability, the owners of a ￿rm
have to decide whether they are willing to ￿nance losses from private funds, or whether they
rather default on the ￿rms obligations in adverse states. However, market conditions themselves
become endogenous in a duopoly since the quantity decisions of all competitors determine the
market price. If now investment is irreversible, it is a strong commitment. It hence becomes a
device to force others to leave early and allows oneself to commit to leave late. If the ability to
promote the exit of a competitor is strong, it may then even result in ￿rms investing only to prey,
i.e. ￿rms invest only to consequently monopolize the market.
Therefore, the model of this paper explains predatory behavior in a duopoly without invoking
reputational, network- or learning-e⁄ects. Moreover, this paper￿ s model also does not de￿ne
predatory behavior as deviations from tacit collusion.
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1 Introduction
Predatory behavior as some special form of anti-competitive practices has a long tradition
of debate both among academic economists and practitioners. It has been studied widely
at least since Selten (1978) introduced his "chain store paradox". Selten claimed that
predatory behavior could not emerge among rational competitors even though predation￿
especially in a dynamic context￿ has some intuitive appeal.
The intuitive predatory outcome could be reestablished by later contributions. How-
ever, most of these contributions either modelled predatory behavior as a static and once-
and-for-all increase in quantity, modelled predation as a result of learning or network
e⁄ects, or de￿ned predation as temporary deviations from tacit collusion. Yet, the present
paper shows that it is not necessary to restrict the analysis of predatory behavior to these
phenomena. In our approach predatory behavior emerges dynamically from time to time,
but is not modelled as a break-down of collusion. Instead, predation results from the
interaction of investment-irreversibility and exit decisions. If investment is irreversible, it
has a strong strategic in￿ uence on exit decisions. It is a commitment to leave the market
late and at the same time it promotes the exit of the competitor. Therefore, ￿rms may
wish to invest upon a decrease in demand. This temporarily depresses prices further and
forces the competitor to exit. Consequently, a market decline triggers a predatory race for
market shares.
Predation was ￿rstly re-established after Selten￿ s "paradox" by Kreps and Wilson
(1982) and by Milgrom and Roberts (1982). They modi￿ed Selten￿ s model by introducing
asymmetry of information among competitors. Yet, predatory behavior in their models
is a static phenomenon as a consequence of the inherently static nature of information.
Firms act more aggressively all the time to deter entry respectively to promote exit of
competitors. Analogously, when strategic commitment triggers predation, in most models
(e.g. Brander and Lewis 1986, Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990, or Glazer, 1994) there is no
change of behavior over time. Again ￿rms act more aggressively in any state of the world.
Empirically however, the aggressiveness of competitors seems to switch from periods of
less competition to periods of aggressive competition and vica versa.1
Existing dynamic theories of predation often take tacit collusion as starting point.
Examples for this are models which study price wars.2 In these models, market conditions
are uncertain (in the future), and so ￿rms have symmetric but imperfect information.
Changes in demand may then trigger deviations from collusion when deviations become
pro￿table. As a result, ￿rms start price wars from time to time, and this approach gives
predation as a dynamic phenomenon a theoretical underpinning. Yet, the focus on tacit
collusion remains a caveat. To avoid this, alternative approaches have been suggested
1See for example Busse￿ s (2002) analysis of price wars in the airline industry.
2See Ordover and Saloner (1989) for a summary or for more recent contributions Fershtman and Pakes
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for network industries3 and industries with prominent learning-curve e⁄ects (Cabral and
Riordan, 1994 and 1997). Nevertheless, these models remain only valid for to certain types
of industries.
However, the strategic commitment approach integrates naturally into a dynamic
framework of predatory behavior, once one accepts the assumption of (partial) irreversibil-
ity of investment. Then, strategic real options theory4 becomes a valid tool to analyze
competition, exit, and irreversible investment. Although irreversible investment is the
possibly strongest form of commitment, and may thus have a strong strategic in￿ uence
on other decisions of a ￿rm, most of the real options literature has ignored the strategic
interaction of (potential) exit and investment.
If a ￿rm can exit a market at will and has only limited liability, its owners have to de-
cide whether they are willing to ￿nance possibly negative cash ￿ ows from private funds, or
whether they rather default on the ￿rms obligations in adverse states. Consequently, ￿rms
need to determine at which market conditions they will optimally default and exit. How-
ever, market conditions themselves become endogenous in a duopoly since the investment
and thus quantity decisions of all competitors determine the market price.
If investment alters the market price of produced goods, investment decisions of one
￿rm alter the likelihood of exit for the other ￿rm: A ￿rm that invests and expands
production, receives higher earnings at the expense of other ￿rms. Upon exit, this ￿rm
looses more income while a non-investing ￿rm looses less income when it leaves. Thus,
the investing ￿rm wishes to delay exit after investment, while the other ￿rm wishes to
exit more early. In consequence, investment is not only a commitment to leave the market
late, but also a device to force others to leave early, so that the interdependence of both
￿rms￿earnings transforms investment into a device with a twofold strategic value. This
strategic value gives ￿rms a strong incentive to commit themselves and invest early and
in the extreme, the ability to promote the exit of a competitor may even result in ￿rms
investing only to prey. They invest only to consequently monopolize the market.
This incentive to monopolize can be substantial and hence, the interplay of limited
liability and irreversibility of investment in￿ uences investment decisions becomes strate-
gically important. Against the strategic incentive ￿rms need to trade o⁄ the gain from
waiting and obtaining more information, the value of waiting. One of the main points
of our paper is the analysis of these two countervailing forces, strategic commitment and
value of waiting.
As both forces counteract, predatory behavior does not take the form of stronger
competition in all states of the world. In our approach, predatory behavior emerges as a
policy triggered by adverse market conditions. Moreover, we do not model predation as a
3See Athey and Schmutzler (2001) for a general model of investment and increasing dominance that
includes network-industries as a special case.
4See for example Huisman and Kort (1999), Sparla (2001), Weeds (2003), or Murto (2004).The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 3
break down of some collusive situation. The break down of collusion has been studied by
Grenadier (1996) in a real options duopoly-model of investment. In his model investment
cascades are triggered by a market decline that breaks up collusion. In our model, we also
￿nd investment in declining markets, but we explain this as a result of an interaction of
investment and exit decisions.
This interaction and predatory behavior are our two points of focus, and that focus
clearly distinguishes our work from existing ones which study exit decisions in a duopoly
using a real options framework: Sparla (2001) discusses partial but irreversible capacity
reductions, Lambrecht (2001) and Murto (2004) both analyze complete exit. In all three
papers (Sparla, Murto and Lambrecht), ￿rms are assumed to be unable to increase ca-
pacity, so that predatory behavior cannot emerge. Yet, Lambrecht also studies sequential
market entry and exit decisions. There, he ￿nds that entrants sometimes crowd out an
existing monopolist upon market entry. Nevertheless, there is no market entry in a declin-
ing market in his model and the roles of the ￿rms are preassigned with respect to who
enters ￿rst.
Both, irreversible investment and exit decisions, have been studied before by Joaquin
and Khanna (2001), but predatory investment cannot occur in their model of potential
competition, because they assume that (rational) exit of the competitor imposes a loss on
the remaining ￿rm. For a monopoly, Jou (2001) models both, entry and exit, and relates
them to the issue of optimal ￿nancing. Obviously predation is no issue in monopoly.
Wether predatory behavior occurs in equilibrium in our model depends on idiosyn-
cratic and on aggregate factors. In the aggregate the ￿ competitiveness￿ of the market
is important. If adjustment costs are high or prices hardly react to changes in quantity,
predatory investment never occurs.
In the idiosyncratic domain, the di⁄erence between ￿rms in ￿xed running (overhead)
costs determines their propensity for predation. In this respect, the most closely related
papers are Fershtman and Pakes￿(2000) theoretical work and the empirical paper of Busse
(2002). Busse ￿nds for the airline industry that ￿nancial leverage is one of the main
determinants for starting a price war. This result is important for our ￿ndings, as interest
payments on debt are naturally one important source of ￿xed cost. Moreover, Busse ￿nds
that the probability of starting a price war reacts in a non-linear fashion to changes in the
￿nancial situation of a ￿rm. We ￿nd a similar result in our theoretical model.
The theoretical analysis is complemented by numerical examples. The mathematical
structure only allows to generate analytical conditions for optimal strategies. Closed-form
solutions for optimal investment and exit strategies cannot be derived when both deci-
sions are to be considered simultaneously, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). In consequence,
only numerical simulations can provide some insight on the magnitude and economic sig-
ni￿cance of the strategic e⁄ects studied. Therefore, one section of the paper provides
some numerical examples. In these examples, strategic motives are indeed very impor-The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 4
tant. Firms invest predatorily, i.e. not because investment has a positive present value on
its own, but because it allows to drive the competitor out of the market. If strong price
reactions enable predatory behavior upon a market decline, ￿rms also invest early when
the market grows and investment does not immediately force the competitor to exit. In
consequence, the gain from waiting for more information is sometimes even fully o⁄set by
strategic incentives and in this extreme, the ￿rst investor behaves in equilibrium as if it
follows a naive net-present-value rule.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and presents
the basic assumptions. Section 3 discusses non-strategic investment and exit decisions of
monopolists. Section 4 derives ￿rm value in duopoly and the corresponding price triggers
for investment and exit. Section 5 presents our numerical results. Section 6 concludes.
Detailed proofs are available in the appendix.
2 Model setup
2.1 General assumptions
We model a market with stochastic demand ￿ uctuations in continuous time t; t 2 [0;1[.
In this market, up to two risk-neutral ￿rms can produce and sell. Total production given,
the price process (Pt)t￿0 is assumed to be a geometric Brownian motion and shall be given
by
Pt = D(Qt)Yt , (1)
dYt = Yt (￿dt + ￿dBt) . (2)
Yt measures the aggregate state of demand and Bt denotes a standard Brownian motion.
Qt denotes aggregate industry production and the inverse demand D maps these quantities
to prices which are then shifted by Y . Production of each individual ￿rm i at time t shall
be denoted by qi;t. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that output is solely produced
by a capital good which does not depreciate.
For t = 0 we assume that both ￿rms already operate in the market, each with some
initial production qi: Moreover, both ￿rms may exit irreversibly at no cost at any time,
i.e. irreversibly chose q = 0. Additionally, we assume that a ￿rm is unable to temporarily
suspend production. As long as a ￿rm operates it has to pay some ￿xed costs of operation
bi, e.g. coupon payments for debt, overhead costs etc. Therefore, instantaneous pro￿ts of
￿rm i are given by
qi;tPt(Qt;Yt) ￿ bi . (3)
Both ￿rms may also invest and irreversibly (except for potential permanent exit) in-
crease production to ￿ qi at cost Ci. Hence, there are 9 possible states of production (q1;q2):
The set of possible states is given by f0;q
1; ￿ q1g ￿ f0;q
2; ￿ q2g:The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 5
Whenever one of the ￿rms invests or exits, the price changes instantaneously. When
for example one ￿rm quits the price jumps up immediately. For notational convenience,
we de￿ne a function ￿ for the relative price change induced by a change in aggregate









The ￿rms are assumed to have unlimited access to external resources, i.e. they can ￿nance
any losses and investment costs if they wish. Both ￿rms discount future pro￿ts at the risk-
adjusted discount rate ￿, and seek to maximize ￿rm value. The discount rate ￿ shall be
larger than the drift of the price ￿ to obtain a ￿nite expected ￿rm value: Moreover, we
assume j￿j < ￿2
2 : This assures that Pt reaches any ￿nite value in ￿nite time.5
Under these assumptions, the roots of the so called ￿ fundamental quadratic equation￿

















which implies ￿1 > 1 and ￿2 < 0 and ￿1 + ￿2 = 1 ￿ 2
￿
￿2 > 0:
Therefore, as in Jou (2001, p. 72), the general solutions for the ￿rm value Vi(P;qi;q￿i)




￿ + ai1(qi;q￿i)P￿1 + ai2(qi;q￿i)P￿2. (6)
The constants ai1 and ai2 re￿ ect not only the (qi;q￿i)-state dependent option value of
the investment and exit option; but also the expected change in pro￿ts due to potential
actions of the competitor. Consequently, strategic considerations have an important in￿ u-
ence on both parameters, and ai1 and ai2 will vary with the state of production (qi;q￿i):
2.3 Game sequence and equilibrium concept
Therefore, ai1 and ai2; have to be solved for by deriving further conditions that re￿ ect the
dynamic optimality of investment and exit plans. Hence, it is useful to recall the timing
structure of the game. At each point in time an active ￿rm may chose to
(1) invest and increase capacity to ￿ qi if it has not invested yet,
(2) exit and become inactive from then on,
(3) or keep production constant and wait.
5As Sparla (2001) argues, if the drift ￿ is strong compared to the variance ￿
2, the probability that
￿rms will not exit in ￿nite time is strictly positive. However, this causes notational inconvenience as one
root of the ￿ fundamental quadratic equation￿(see below) has to be ￿ adjusted￿to derive the correct value
functions, see Sparla (2001) for details.
6See appendix for details. As usual, we denote by ￿rm ￿i the competitor of ￿rm i.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 6
Figure 1: Examples of possible sequences of events
Consequently, each state (q1;q2) can be seen as subgame (stage) and the following
sections will derive and specify ￿rm value and strategies at the various states (q1;q2).
Figure 1 displays some of the possible sequences of action that may occur depending
on the realization of the Brownian motion.
We do not assume which ￿rm invests or exits ￿rst, but let this be determined in
equilibrium. Therefore, whenever the ￿rst ￿rm acts (invests or exits) the other ￿rm must
be at least indi⁄erent between acting somewhat earlier to be the ￿rst mover or taking the
action later as the second mover. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss ￿rst the behavior
of both ￿rms as second mover (for investment just as for exit) to obtain the valuation of
both competitors for the second mover￿ s position. This valuation is crucial for solving the
competition for the position of the ￿rst mover using the just outlined indi⁄erence principle
for equilibrium investment and exit. For the exit game the position of the second mover
coincides with the position of a monopolist.
When positions are valued di⁄erently, the analysis greatly simpli￿es. To obtain this
simpli￿cation, the ￿xed costs of both ￿rms shall di⁄er. There may also (but not nec-
essarily) be a di⁄erence between both ￿rms with respect to the quantities the two ￿rms
produce both, at high and at low capacity. All di⁄erences, both in costs and quantities, are
summarized in the function li (qi) := bi
qiD(qi); the ratio of ￿xed costs to monopoly earnings
at Yt = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume ￿rm 2 is the ￿rm with the the larger
ratio of ￿xed costs to earnings once both ￿rms have invested. In other words ￿rm 1 is
more e¢ cient with respect to overhead costs.
Assumption 1: l1 (￿ q1) < l2 (￿ q2):
The cost di⁄erence now allows us to concentrate on simple trigger strategies to char-The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 7
acterize ￿rm behavior. These strategies de￿ne a price trigger for investment and exit of
a ￿rm for any state of the game in which that ￿rm is active. Firms can chose a non-
predatory strategy that is characterized by exit at low prices and by a single price





. If a ￿rm chooses a predatory strategy it
will not exit at low prices, but will instead use its investment option and invest, since this
promotes the exit of the competitor.
De￿nition 1 A vector P
#
i 2 R11

































































characterizes a stationary Markov-strategy of ￿rm i:
This notation of a strategy allows for both predatory and non predatory behavior.
Given strategy P
#
i ￿rm i invests when the price is equal to or is larger than the investment
price trigger for the ￿rst time in the current state (q1;q2). Firm i exits when the price
equals the respective exit-price trigger for the ￿rst time.
If the strategy is non-predatory, we have P
pred;i
q
i;￿ q￿i < P
exit;i
q









values make sure that ￿rm i never invests predatorily, since it will have left before the
triggers are reached.
In a predatory strategy at least one of the triggers P
pred;i
q




￿i falls between the
respective exit and investment price-triggers. In this case ￿rm i invests also when the
price falls to the predatory investment price-trigger. It does so, since investment promotes
the exit of the competitor.
Predatory price triggers are de￿ned for any state in which the ￿rm can still increase
capacity. Therefore, a strategy de￿nes for each state a price trigger for investment, for
predation and for exit, although prices may actually never reach that price triggers of ￿rm









￿i is actually reached, the state changes, and the trigger now e⁄ective is
P
exit;i
￿ qi;0 : Therefore, the strategy de￿nition de￿nes also (most) behavior out of equilibrium.
Out of equilibrium situations are only ignored in our de￿nition of a strategy for ￿rm i if
they result form a mistake of ￿rm i itself. This simpli￿cation allows to describe strategies
in the convenient price trigger form.
So de￿ned strategies are Markovian and stationary as they only condition on the
current price and state but neither on the history of the game (Markovian) nor on time
itself (stationarity). Our focus on pure strategies is motivated by notational convenience,
but underlying is the continuous time equilibrium concept of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 8
This concept uses mixed strategies and an extended strategy space. However, equilibrium
outcomes are equivalent to those in which agents employ pure strategies, see section 3 in
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for details. With the de￿nition of a strategy, we can now
describe what is a best response and an equilibrium in the game studied.
De￿nition 2 A vector of (qi;q￿i)-state-contingent price-triggers ￿ P
#
i is a Markov-perfect




(a) for all (qi;q￿i) it is credible not to exit before the declared exit price-trigger









> 0: (limited liability)




























(c) And using other price triggers P
#
i that ful￿ll the above credibility constraints does not
































































; so that each vector is a best response to the other.
The ￿rst two constraints re￿ ect the credibility of a strategy. If a ￿rm likes to act before
a proposed price trigger has been reached, a threat to use this trigger cannot be credible.
In fact, the "limited liability" is a "no-preemption" constraint for the exit decision. When
the limited liability constraint is binding, ￿rm i chooses to exit before the exit price trigger
is actually reached, i.e. it preempts on its own exit. Note, however, the constraint does
not imply that the ￿rm does never have negative pro￿ts. Only the expected value of
future (and current) pro￿ts must be positive. Therefore, the constraint is conditional on
the strategy of the competitor￿ especially conditional on whether ￿rm i expects to leave
￿rst or expects to leave second.
The optimality constraint implies that the equilibrium price triggers need to be best
response price triggers also for any (q1;q2) subgame. They cannot be just "good threats"The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 9
at the very beginning of the game. Therefore, we can and need to solve for the equilibrium
by backward induction over the states (not over time). Because of this, we start with the
analysis of a monopoly, as this is the "subgame" reached, once one ￿rm has left.
Yet, the de￿nitions above are somewhat imprecise from a very formal perspective.
Strictly speaking, the strategies ￿rms use should be sets of prices and ￿rms exit or invest
once the price hits any boundary of these sets for the ￿rst time. However, we have only
given upper bounds for exit and lower bounds for investment. Murto (2004) shows that
￿rms may optimally use disconnected sets as optimal strategies for exit. This means a ￿rm
may exit when prices reach some high price interval, it will not exit on an interval of smaller
prices, but exit again when prices decrease further (gap-equilibrium). The intermediate
interval of inaction can of course only be reached by intermediate initial prices or by
mistake. Our equilibrium- and best-response de￿nitions understand the ￿rms￿strategies
in Murto￿ s way, but we restrict our analysis only on the largest interval of prices for exit.
This is re￿ ected in our de￿nitions: They give no restriction for ￿rm i for any prices below
its own exit price-trigger. However, this procedure is only justi￿ed in case strategies are
in fact disconnected sets if the initial price is not intermediate.
The following assumption ensures, that (a) price levels always exist, so that investment
is pro￿table and (b) allows us to concentrate on simple price triggers for the exit decisions:
Assumption 2: (a) Investment increases revenues of the investing ￿rm, regardless of
whether the other ￿rm has invested or not, i.e.
D(q
i + q￿i)q
i < D(￿ qi + q￿i)￿ qi; q￿i 2 f0;q
￿i; ￿ q￿ig (8)
(b) Moreover, the initial price-level P0 shall be such that none of the ￿rms optimally
exits at t = 0 or exits when prices increase.
Part (b) of the assumption avoids the kind of di¢ culties of non-unique exit equilibria
studied by Murto (2004).
3 Firm Value, and the Timing of Investment and Exit for a Monopolist
3.1 Monopolist with large capacity
We begin our analysis with a monopolist that has already carried out its investment
option. This subgame is reached when a monopolist with low capacity invests or when
the competitor of a duopolist with high capacity exits. In other words, the monopolist￿ s
position is the position of the second mover with respect to exit.
The case of a monopolist with an exit option is well studied which allows us to primarily
build on established results￿ e.g. from Jou (2001). For a monopolist who already operates
at high capacity the following rationale determines the value of ai1 and ai2 and leads toThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 10
Proposition 1. When price P tends to in￿nity the option to exit becomes worthless and
so ai1 (￿ qi;0) = 0: When exit is timed optimally a value matching and a smooth pasting
condition must hold, so that we can infer P
exit;i
￿ qi;0 and ai2 (￿ qi;0) from these two conditions
which are given by the following equations
Vi(P
exit;i
￿ qi;0 ; ￿ qi;0) = 0 (9)
@Vi(P
exit;i
qi;0 ; ￿ qi;0)
@P
= 0: (10)
Proposition 1 Having invested, the monopolist·s ￿rm value is























Proof. Denote the revenues process by R := ￿ qiP: This process has exactly the same
properties as the price process in Jou (2001). The proposition then follows straightforward
from Jou·s Proposition 1.








to the expected value of pro￿ts ￿ qi
P
￿￿￿￿ bi
￿ the ￿rm would obtain when continuing operation
in￿nitely.
3.2 Monopolist with an investment option
If the monopolist is able to increase capacity, ai1 is no longer zero. Instead, the ability
to increase capacity adds another pair of value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions,
which are optimality conditions for investment. Now ai1 and ai2 both have to be si-
multaneously solved for from the system of equations generated by smooth-pasting and







i;￿ qi ￿ P
inv;i
q




















The former condition equalizes the value before investment and value after investment,
taking into account the cost of investment Ci: The latter condition ensures that value
changes smoothly in Y: Due to the change in production, prices react di⁄erently to changes
in Y before and after investment. The ￿q
i;￿ qi term corrects for this.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 11














Yet, the value function is more complicated and involves terms to the power of ￿1 and
￿2: This no longer allows to solve for the optimal price triggers analytically. However, the
trigger prices and ai1 and ai2 can be determined numerically from equations (12) ￿ (15):
4 Firm Value, and the timing of investment and exit in duopoly
In contrast to monopoly, behavior in duopoly is determined by strategic considerations.
The complexity of the strategic situation increases with the number of ￿rms that can
increase capacity. Therefore, we begin with the analysis of a duopoly in which both
￿rms have already exercised their investment option and operate at high capacity ￿ qi.7
Thereafter, we analyze the situation which naturally precedes this one: One ￿rm is already
at high capacity, whereas the other ￿rm still operates at low capacity and may invest. At
last the situation is studied where both ￿rms still have the option to invest.
4.1 Both ￿rms operate at high capacity
When both ￿rms have invested, so that we are in state (￿ q1; ￿ q2); both ￿rm nevertheless
have to decide whether and when to exit. This decision in particular determines who
leaves ￿rst and who monopolizes the market. However, a priori it is not obvious which
￿rm will leave ￿rst. But since we assumed the two ￿rms to di⁄er in their ￿xed costs of
operation, the only Markov-perfect equilibrium of the resulting exit game is the one in
which the ￿rm with the larger overhead exits at its monopoly exit price. This is shown by
the proposition below, which is similar to Murto￿ s (2004, p. 13) result when gap equilibria
do not exist or Lambrecht￿ s (2001) result for the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the exit
game.8
Proposition 2 In all Markov-perfect equilibria in pure strategies of the (￿ q1; ￿ q2)-subgame
(exit after investment), ￿rm 2, the ￿rm with the larger ￿xed costs, chooses its monopoly




q2;0 , whereas ￿rm 1 chooses as














7This is similar to the pure exit games studied by Lambrecht (2001) and Murto (2004).
8As there are equal costs of exit (they are zero for both ￿rms) in our model no gap equilibria can arise
when ￿rms only decide on exit.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 12
Firm 2 exits at its monopoly exit price trigger, but this does not mean ￿rm 2 quits at
the same state of demand Y as in monopoly. Total production is larger in duopoly and
this lowers the price keeping the state of aggregate demand Y constant. Thus, as exit
occurs at the same price, in duopoly the exit state of demand Y must be larger than in
monopoly.
Since ￿rm 1 leaves second in equilibrium, its exit price-trigger, P
exit;1
q1;q2 ; is in a sense
just "virtual". Along the equilibrium path, this price trigger will never be reached: Firm
2 quits before the price drops to P
exit;1
q1;q2 ; the new state is (￿ q1;0), and the e⁄ective exit
price-trigger becomes P
exit;1
q1;0 : Thus, P
exit;1
q1;q2 only determines what ￿rm 1 would do if ￿rm
2 by mistake (with zero probability) had not left when the price drops to P
exit;1
q1;q2 :
Due to this virtuality, P
exit;1
q1;q2 is partly undetermined. Firm 1 can choose any exit



















With exit price-triggers determined on the basis of Proposition 2, we can now compute
the value functions when both ￿rms are at high capacity. According to Proposition 2, ￿rm
2 behaves myopically and so its value function is the same as when it is a monopolist.
Firm 2￿ s potential exit, however, changes ￿rm 1·s value, and so, its value function
needs to be determined anew; especially the ￿ option values￿a11; a12 in (6) have to be
re-calculated.
Again to determine a11 we suppose price tends to in￿nity. Then the exit option becomes
worthless and hence a11 = 0:9 The other constant, a12; can be solved from the following
value-matching condition at the exit price of ￿rm 2
V1(P
exit;2
q2;0 ; ￿ q1; ￿ q2) = V1(￿￿ q1+￿ q2;￿ q1P
exit;2
q2;0 ; ￿ q1;0): (16)
This condition equalizes ￿rm 1￿ s value at the logical second before and after the exit of
￿rm 2. The condition yields for a12 after some algebraic calculations












with g de￿ned as





















is the ratio of monopoly exit prices; the stated inequalities are
shown to hold in the appendix. Substituting (17) in (6) we obtain for the value of ￿rm 1
9See e.g. Jou (2001) for details.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 13
Figure 2: Equity-value of ￿rm 1
(a) g is large, V non-monotonous (b) g is small, V monotonous
the following expressions














, P ￿ P
exit;2
q2;0 . (18)
As one can now easily see, a factor g > 1 is added in (11) to the price of the exit option
in the presence of a competitor who leaves the market when prices decline. Factor g is
composed of the costs of postponed exit (￿￿ q1+￿ q2;￿ q1)
￿2 and the gain when ￿rm 2 exits,
which is a ￿ hedge￿ against bad states. This hedge outweighs the cost of waiting, thus
increases value, and￿ importantly for what follows￿ kinks value of ￿rm 1 at the price at
which ￿rm 2 exits. Once ￿rm 2 has left, only the limited liability (partly) shields ￿rm
1 against losses induced by a decrease in price. In contrast, before ￿rm 2 has left, when
prices drop ￿rm 1 can expect also to gain from ￿rm 2 leaving .
How much value ￿rm 1 gains upon exit of ￿rm 2 especially depends on the demand
function. When prices react very strongly to changes in quantity, the value gain and hence
g is large. In such a case ￿rm 1￿ s value may even decrease in price when the price is near
the exit price of ￿rm 2￿ see ￿gures 2(a),(b).
This point is of importance, as it is crucial for enabling predatory investment, as we






￿ q2;0 , i.e. when ￿rm 2 exits:
@V1(Pexit











































and factor g can be arbitrarily large when ￿￿ q1+￿ q2;￿ q1 is large. For the last inequality to
hold, it is su¢ cient that ￿￿2 (￿￿ q1+￿ q2;￿ q1 ￿ 1) > 1:The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 14
4.2 One ￿rm operates at high capacity while the other ￿rm has an
investment option
Before both ￿rms reach high capacity, ￿rms invest sequentially. As Huisman and Kort
(1999) show, non (tacit)-collusive simultaneous investment does not occur in equilibrium.
Although both ￿rms may become leader in equilibrium in the homogeneous setting they
study, almost surely the ￿rms never invest simultaneously if not colluding. So without
collusion we can concentrate the analysis on sequential investment.
Concentrating on sequential investment will help to keep our analysis focused. There-
fore, we do not explicitly study collusive simultaneous investment nor do we study collu-
sive inaction. Collusive equilibria actually may arise, but the analysis for this carries over
straightforward from Huisman and Kort (1999). Will will turn again to this point when
we discuss the competition for the leader￿ s position.
To study this competition, we analyze the investment decisions inducing backwardly
over the (qi;q￿i)-states. So we begin with the situation where ￿rm ￿i already increased
capacity and ￿rm i may now follow. We have seen that the ￿rms di⁄er substantially once
both are at high capacity. Due to this asymmetry, we need to study the behavior of both
￿rms as followers separately. We begin with ￿rm 2. It turns out that this is the easier
case to analyze.
4.2.1 Firm 2 as follower
We have seen that ￿rm 2 will leave the market ￿rst when both ￿rms are at high capacity.
At low capacity, ￿rm 2￿ s overhead costs are even larger relative to its earnings than they
are when ￿rm 2 operates at high capacity. Thus, before investment ￿rm 2 is in a weaker
position than after investment, see ￿gure 3. Therefore, ￿rm 2 will also exit ￿rst if it
operates at low capacity and ￿rm 2￿ s investment will delay ￿rm 2￿ s own exit. Moreover,
investment does not alter this outcome of the exit game, once ￿rm 1 already operates





￿rm 2 leaves ￿rst just as in state (￿ q1; ￿ q2): This
allows ￿rm 2 to completely ignore the strategic character of the situation:
Proposition 3 As a follower, ￿rm 2 behaves myopically. It chooses the same exit and
investment price-triggers that a monopolist on the residual demand function D(q2 + ￿ q1)
would choose. Firm 1 uses an exit price trigger analogously to proposition 2 and exits
second.
Proof. See appendix.
That ￿rm 2 as follower behaves myopically is a result similar to other games with
preemption (e.g. Weeds, 2003).The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 15
Figure 3: Exit-prices and value of ￿rm 2
4.2.2 Firm 1 as follower
If ￿rm 1 is the follower the strategic situation changes dramatically: In contrast to ￿rm
2, ￿rm 1￿ s actions a⁄ect the likelihood of its competitor (￿rm 2) leaving the market. This
increases the value of investment for ￿rm 1 and induces ￿rm 1 to exercise its investment
option more early.
Yet, more interesting is what happens at low prices. Consider the following situation:
Suppose at low capacity ￿rm 1 has a much smaller production than ￿rm 2, but both ￿rm
have similar overhead costs. Without any investment option ￿rm 1 would clearly leave
￿rst. Suppose that ￿rm 1 still exits ￿rst if it only invests when the price rises. This may
now lead to the interesting situation shown in ￿gure 4. In this ￿gure, at high capacity
V1 is falling in P; which is possible as we have seen. For intermediate prices the gain in
expected earnings does not cover the costs of investment. However, for both high and low
prices there is a gain from investing. At high prices investment pays and is carried out at
a high price-trigger. For low prices ￿rm 1 has a high probability to monopolize the market
soon if it invests and so investment becomes pro￿table at low prices, too. In consequence,
￿rm 1 would not exit, but rather predatorily invest when prices decline. Firm 2 does not
have this opportunity to prey.
Whether or not ￿rm 1 preys, we need to determine in order to calculate the equilibrium




the moment, this price-trigger can be taken as given, but will be determined endogenously
in equilibrium in a later section. Yet, individual optimality already puts a restriction
to the exit price-trigger, as the following Lemma shows. This Lemma proves useful in
discussing the existence of predatory investment in our model.
Lemma 1 (a) If ￿rm 2 leaves the market ￿rst, P
exit;2
￿ q2;￿ q1 < P
exit;2
￿ q2;q
1 holds and P
exit;2
￿ q2;￿ q1 = P
exit;2
q2;0
as derived in Proposition 3.







￿ q2;￿ q1 :The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 16
Figure 4: Possibility of predatory investment
Proof. See appendix.
Now, what determines whether ￿rm 1 invests predatorily? For predatory investment
to occur, ￿rm 1￿ s gain in value from increasing capacity must exceed investment costs
also at low prices. This value gain, is the di⁄erence of ￿rm 1￿ s value at high capacity,
V1(￿q1+q2;q1+q2P;q1;q2) and ￿rm 1 value at low capacity, ^ V1(P;q
1;q2); assuming ￿rm 1
can only invest at a single high price trigger. If the value gain from investment exceeds
investment costs at prices below the single price trigger, ￿rm 1 enjoys a capital gain by





￿ q2;￿ q1 ; which happens when the value gain from investing is not
smaller than investment costs, C1; for intermediate prices. When investment costs exceed
the returns from investment for intermediate prices, like they do in ￿gure 4, then ￿rm 1
will predatorily invest at a low price additionally to its investment at a high price trigger.
For this high price trigger, it is necessary to know at least a lower bound that separates
the regular investment from predatory investment. Otherwise, the price triggers cannot be
distinguished numerically and the hypothetical value function ^ V1 cannot be determined.
To obtain this lower bound to the investment price trigger, we construct another
hypothetical value function for ￿rm 1 under the assumption that ￿rm 1 has no investment
option at all. For this hypothetical situation, the exit equilibrium can be easily found by
applying proposition 2, and so the hypothetical value function, ~ V1; is well de￿ned. The
function itself is a lower bound to the true value of ￿rm 1, just as it is a lower bound to
^ V1.
Having constructed ~ V1; we then compare this theoretical value with the value of ￿rm 1
at high capacity. For very large prices ~ V1(P;q
1;q2) < V1(￿q1+q2;q1+q2P;q1;q2) ￿ C1 must
hold, since investment pays due to assumption 2(a). Therefore, the (largest) solution to
~ V1(P;q
1;q2) + C1 = V1(￿q1+q2;q1+q2P;q1;q2)The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 17
is our lower bound to regular investment.
If on the one hand investment does not pay for all prices, but on the other hand
predatory investment is pro￿table, then there must be a price region Z where
^ V1(P;q
1;q2) > e V1(P;q
1;q2) > V1(￿q1+q2;q1+q2P;q1;q2) ￿ C1:
holds for P 2 Z; but for some P0 < minZ
^ V1(P0;q
1;q2) < V1(￿q1+q2;q1+q2P0;q1;q2) ￿ C1
holds, so that investment is pro￿table at P0. Since e V1 is a lower bound for ^ V1, the last
inequality implies
e V1(P0;q
1;q2) < V1(￿q1+q2;q1+q2P0;q1;q2) ￿ C1:
Consequently, since both functions are continuous, it is necessary for predation to occur
that
e V1(P;q
1;q2) + C1 = V1(￿q1+q2;q1+q2P;q1;q2) (21)
has more than one solution in P, recall ￿gure 4 and see ￿gure 5. The largest solution to
this equation de￿nes the lower bound for the non-predatory investment price-trigger. At
most we may have 4 di⁄erent price regions that di⁄er in the pro￿tability of investment:








At most two of these solutions can be larger than ￿￿1
q1+q2;q1+q2P
exit;2
￿ q2;￿ q1 .
We denote the solutions with P￿(< P￿￿)(< P￿￿￿) respectively and the set of solutions by
S.
Proof. See appendix.
Hence, formally max(S) is our lower bound for non-predatory investment. Figure 5
displays possible solutions to (21) that are non-unique.
If there is no solution, ￿rm 1 will invest at any price. This may occur when the costs of
investing are low, the competitor￿ s exit is very likely, and prices react strongly to changes in
quantity. In this case monopoly is a very valuable position and ￿rm 1￿ s investment speeds
up the competitor￿ s exit substantially. Then investment allows ￿rm 1 to monopolize the
market much sooner, so that ￿rm 1 likes to invest at any price level. In such a situation
however, ￿rm 2 has no incentive at all to be the ￿rst ￿rm to invest. We will not further
focus on this case.
If there is only one solution, we know that there will be no predatory investment.
Given the exit equilibrium, in the single solution case investment is determined by theThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 18
Figure 5: Multiple solutions to (21)
(a) two solutions (b) three solutions





1; ￿ q2) = V1(￿q1+q2;q1+q2P
inv;1
q




















If (21) has only one solution, we can solve for the investment price-trigger and value












If there is more than one solution to (21) we need to calculate the value of ￿rm 1 if
it was restricted to invest at a price above max(S): This is the value function ^ V and
the corresponding hypothetical investment price-trigger ^ P
inv;1
q












: For this calculation, we simply use the above two
conditions (22) and (23), but constrain ^ P
inv;1
q
1;￿ q2 to be larger than max(S):
We then compare the value after investment V1(￿q1+￿ q2;￿ q1+￿ q2P; ￿ q1; ￿ q2) with the hypo-
thetical value ^ V (P;q












such that the gain in value from investment, ^ V (P;q
1; ￿ q2) ￿
V1(￿q1+￿ q2;￿ q1+￿ q2P; ￿ q1; ￿ q2); outweighs investment costs C1; then ￿rm 1 has an incentive to
invest predatorily. This means, we search for solutions to
^ V (P;q














; where ^ P
inv;1
q
1;￿ q2 is a solution by de￿nition. Two
possible structures may emerge as displayed in ￿gure 6:
1. If (24) has one further solution, there is an Investment/ No-Investment/ Investment
scheme, i.e. a low price-trigger for which investment occurs and a high price trigger
for investment and a region of inactivity in between. See ￿gure 6(a).
2. If (24) has three solutions, the situation gets more complex. If occasionally P isThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 19
Figure 6: Solutions to (24)
(a) two solutions (b) three solutions
very low, ￿rm 1 has no incentive to invest because ￿rm 2￿ s exit is very likely anyway.
When the price rises, ￿rm 1 ￿nds it pro￿table to invest predatorily. Yet, as the price
rises further ￿rm 1 again becomes inactive, but invests again when prices get very
large. See ￿gure 6(b). Starting between the two largest solutions, we obtain the
same Investment/ No-Investment/ Investment scheme as above.
Now, when does predatory investment occur? The following proposition gives su¢ cient
conditions









(a) Then V1 (P; ￿ q1; ￿ q2) obtains its minimum on P > P
exit;2












: Moreover, assume that the revenue increase from investment is small
















; so that ￿rm 2 exits ￿rst at low capacity without investment
option. Moreover, assume ￿rm 1￿ s value at high capacity decreases faster in Y than





















Then there exist investment cost C1 so that predatory investment occurs. @V
@P+ is the
right-hand partial derivative:The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 20
Proof. See appendix.
The case studied in part (c) of the proposition is relatively restrictive. It requires
that ￿rm 1 bene￿ts from a change in the likelihood of ￿rm 2￿ s exit more strongly at high
capacity than it does at low capacity. This occurs, if ￿rm 1 is small at low capacity, but
is relatively large at high capacity. Unfortunately, the condition cannot be boiled down to
an expressions similar to those in part (b) of the proposition.
The proposition, however, does not clarify whether we may arrive in a situation like
in ￿gure 6(a) or (b). For the ￿gure 6(b)-type situation the later analysis quickly becomes
very complex. We can however avoid complications even in this situation and keep the
following analysis focused and tractable by assuming ￿rm 2 does not invest at very low
prices. Then predatory investment of ￿rm 1 only occurs when prices fall:
Assumption 3: The investment cost of ￿rm 2, C2; are large enough so that ￿rm 2 will
















: To see this, suppose S has three elements (P￿;P￿￿;P￿￿￿); from






Therefore, the smallest element of S; P￿; is smaller than the price after investment: Hence,
it cannot be the case that ￿rm 1 ￿nds predatory investment pro￿table after an increase
in price, but not initially. See ￿gure 6(b).
Of course, predatory investment does not always occur. When prices react weakly
to changes in supply, then ￿rm 1 does not gain much from ￿rm 2￿ s exit. This gives the
following
Proposition 5 If demand is su¢ ciently elastic, i.e. 8Q1;Q2 : ￿Q1;Q2 ￿ 1; or if demand
is not too inelastic and the costs of investment C1 are su¢ ciently large, then predatory
investment never occurs.
Proof. See appendix.
In case predatory investment does occur, the exit value-matching condition for ￿rm 1







q1;q2 ;q1;q2) ￿ C1 . (25)
This value matching condition requires value before and after investment to be equal at
the time of predatory investment. On the timing for its investment, ￿rm 1 decides without
any constraint. For regular investment, it uses a smooth-pasting condition to optimally
determine the price trigger. For predatory investment, ￿rm 1 will always wait until the
price falls to the point at which investment forces the other ￿rm to leave immediately
afterwards. This is a result of the following Lemma.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 21
Proposition 6 If a ￿rm invests predatorily (but does not invest at any price), it prefers




q￿i;￿ qi : At this price the competitor leaves





￿rm 1 prefers to invest
predatorily at ￿￿1
q
1+￿ q2;￿ q1+￿ q2P
exit;2






q2;0 the value function V1(￿q
1+q2;q1+q2P;q1;q2) has a kink, so there
is no need for a smooth-pasting condition to hold￿ which is may be a simpli￿ed alternative
way to express the above Lemma.
Economically, this means ￿rm 1 will wait with predatory investment until investment
will force ￿rm 2 to leave directly afterwards with probability 1. Before, the increase in
earnings does not cover the costs of investment and also ￿rm i does not loose any monopoly
gain by waiting for a further price decrease. It can still make sure to obtain that gain by




q2;0 : Waiting longer is suboptimal, ￿rm 1 would forego
the monopoly pro￿ts. In summary:













q2;0 as price trigger for predatory investment.
4.3 Investment decisions in duopoly when no ￿rm has invested yet
When neither of the ￿rms has invested, yet, both ￿rms compete for being the ￿rst investor
(leader) timing investment strategically. Suppose ￿rm i becomes the leader. While q￿i
stays low, ￿rm i has invested and increased its own capacity and now can only decide on
exit. However, ￿rm i is still in￿ uenced by ￿rm -i￿ s investment decisions. Therefore, ￿rm
i0s value function is determined by the value-matching condition for the price at which








￿i;￿ qi ;q1;q2); (26)
and if ￿rm i expects to leave ￿rst, value matching for exit yields
Vi(P
exit;i
￿ qi;q￿i; ￿ qi;q￿i) = 0; (27)
or else, when ￿rm i expects to leave second, value matching yields
Vi(P
exit;￿i
q￿i;￿ qi ; ￿ qi;q￿i) = Vi(￿￿ qi+q
￿i;￿ qiP
exit;￿i
q￿i;￿ qi ; ￿ qi;0): (28)
These conditions determine ￿rm i0s valuation of the leader￿ s position. This valuation
di⁄ers from the valuation of the follower￿ s position and the value di⁄erence between both
positions determines ￿rm i0s incentive to preempt on ￿rm ￿i and take the lead. Following
Huisman and Kort (1999), we de￿ne a function ￿i(P) that represents the advantage ofThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 22
taking the role of the leader at price P: This means ￿i(P) measures the di⁄erence in value
of investing at P instead of becoming the follower when the other ￿rm invests at price P:






Whenever ￿i(P) = 0 ￿rm i is indi⁄erent between taking the lead at price P and follow-
ing. In order to describe the root-behavior of ￿i(P) some more (short-hand) notation is






price at which ￿rm i invests after becoming the
follower by Pi, i.e. Pi = ￿￿1
qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP
inv;i
qi;q￿i. Analogously, Pi is the price at which ￿rm













The following proposition gives the maximum number of indi⁄erence points, i.e. solutions
to ￿i(P) = 0.








￿i(P) = 0 (29)
has at most three solutions.
(b) Suppose Pi ￿ P￿i, so ￿rm i as follower invests earlier than ￿rm ￿i would do in that
position. Then ￿i(P) = 0 has at most two solutions on M: In addition to solutions
on M, P￿i is also a solution and
@￿i(P￿i)
@P < 0:





(d) If ￿i(P) = 0 has two solutions on M and Pi ￿ P￿i as in (b), or ￿i(P) = 0 has three
solutions and Pi > P￿i as in (c), then ￿i(maxfPig) > 0: Moreover, there can only
exist one additional solution on min
j=1;2
fPjg < P < max
j=1;2
fPjg if Pi < P￿i:
Proof. See appendix.
If there are two solutions to ￿i(P) = 0 and Pi ￿ P￿i (or three solutions and Pi > P￿i),
the smallest one is the preemption threshold for predatory investment and the (next)
larger one is the preemption threshold for non-predatory investment. These thresholds




pre respectively. They are represented by the dotted lines
in ￿gure 7(a) and represent a price at which ￿rm i is indi⁄erent between being the leader
and being the follower. For (an environment of) prices below P
pred;i
pre and above P
inv;i
pre ￿rm
i prefers the leader￿ s position.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 23
Figure 7: Preemption thresholds for
(a) both, predatory and regular investment (b) only regular investment
If there is only one solution for ￿i(P) = 0 on M, there is only a non-predatory
preemption threshold, see ￿gure 7(b).
If Pi ￿ P￿i; then ￿i( ￿ Pi) > 0: At ￿ Pi ￿rm i follows, i.e. it invests and has to pay
investment costs Ci: The game now enters state (￿ qi; ￿ q￿i): This is worse for ￿rm i than
being the leader at the same aggregate state of demand Y: The leader￿ s position implies a
higher price, since ￿rm ￿i￿ s investment is still to come.
In the extreme the leader￿ s position can be so valuable for ￿rm i that ￿i(P) = 0 may
have no solution on M: Suppose, for example, that the price reacts very strong to quantity
changes and only ￿rm i taking the lead can force ￿rm ￿i to exit ￿rst. In such a case ￿rm
i has a strong incentive to invest both, predatorily and non-predatorily.
When there are no solutions to ￿i(P) = 0; obviously no solution can serve as a pre-
emption threshold. Instead we set P
inv;i
pre = min(M) and P
pred;i
pre = Pi: This is the only





Also, the other extreme may be attained. If Pi > P￿i, ￿rm i might prefer to be the
second mover at any price, so that ￿i(P) < 0 for all P < Pi: If the value of waiting is
very large for ￿rm i due to large overhead costs, such a situation may for example occur.
However, by de￿nition ￿i( ￿ Pi) = 0 and hence we set P
inv;i
pre = Pi.
Now, these thresholds and ￿i(P) only describe the incentive of ￿rm i to take the
lead and invest, given that it expects its competitor to do the same otherwise. It can
well be that none of the ￿rms would unilaterally like to invest below max ￿ Pj; although
preemption thresholds from ￿i(P) = 0 exist. The function ￿i only describes conditional
incentives to invest earlier, and this conditionality applies to both regular and predatory
investment. For predation, there may be a situation where none of the ￿rms gains from
predatory investment unless it expects the other ￿rm to prey in the future. For regular
investment, both ￿rms may prefer the gains from tacit-collusive delay (or even inactivity)
to the leader￿ s position at all prices.
This leads to the well studied typical problem of non-unique equilibria in timing games
of (dis-)investment which is associated with Fudenberg and Tirole·s (1985) notion ofThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 24
perfect timing game equilibria. Equilibria that only base on the relative valuation of the
leaders position are not renegotiation proof.10 Hence, for non-predatory investment we





, with the valuation of
the leader￿ s position Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP;qi;q￿i)￿Ci. We do not derive the collusive value
function explicitly but refer to Huisman and Kort (1999), Sparla (2001) or Weeds (2003)
for a detailed discussion and derivation of V C
i in similar cases.11 If there exists a price
such that one ￿rm prefers the leader￿ s position over simultaneous investment, only the
preemption equilibrium studied in the proposition below prevails:
Proposition 7 If there exists a P such that for one of the ￿rms Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP;qi;q￿i)￿





; then the only Markov-perfect equilibrium for the preemption game





pre : Firm L takes the lead and chooses an investment-price trigger so that the competi-









L;q￿L is set unconstrained optimal and solves a smooth pasting condition, if




As outlined before, that preemption thresholds exist for predatory investment does
not necessarily imply that predatory investment occurs in a renegotiation-proof Markov-
perfect equilibrium. Again, we need to de￿ne an auxiliary value function ^ V : This function
is based on assumed exit price-triggers and the non-predatory investment equilibrium as









+ C < Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP
exit;￿i
q￿i;￿ qi ;qi;q￿i) (30)
there will be predation in equilibrium. If in addition predatory preemption thresholds are
de￿ned for both ￿rms￿ i.e.￿i(P) = 0 has multiple solutions￿ then there will be preemp-
tion for predation and the following proposition describes the resulting equilibria.






pre for both ￿rms. Then the only Markov-perfect equilibrium
(outcome) is that the ￿rm with the higher P
pred;i
pre takes the lead for predatory invest-
ment. It invests when the price falls to P
pred;i
q






10Indeed, in some numerical simulations (not reported) we found non-renegotiation-proof predatory
equilibria. Renegotiation-prooveness is but a strong assumption on rationality.
Therefore, we might in reality observe a circular situation of the following form: One agent takes pre-
emptive, predatory action in threat of a predatory action of the other agent. This other agent however
has no incentive to undertake that action as long as the ￿rst agent does not take action. The ￿rst agent
however takes action as she is threatened. Triggered o⁄ by a sunspot, the situation escalates.
11The appendix contains a description of how this function can be derived.
FOR THE REFEREE: This appendix could be dropped to shorten the paper.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 25

















pre for ￿rm i and one of the ￿rms has an unilateral (un-








. If P0 > P
pred;i
pre ; then in all
Markov-perfect equilibria ￿rm ￿i invests predatorily at P
pred;i
pre .




pre for one of the ￿rms, but none of the ￿rms has








: Then in all renegotiation-
proof Markov-perfect equilibria ￿rm i invests predatorily at its unconstrained optimal
predatory investment price-trigger or at P
pred;￿i
pre ; whichever is the higher price.
Proof. See appendix.
If there is no preemption for predation but ￿rm i has an unilateral incentive to prey, i.e.
(30) holds for ￿rm i; then ￿rm i will invest predatorily at ￿￿1
qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP
exit;￿i
q￿i;￿ qi : To avoid
further complication for determining the exit price-triggers, and avoid strategic situations
of the "gap-equilibrium" type studied by Murto (2004), we make the following assumption
according to the price-level (and investment costs) in t = 0 :
Assumption 4: At the initial price-level P0 at least one ￿rm ￿nds it unpro￿table to


















So far, we have taken the price-triggers which both ￿rms use for their exit-decision as
given. However, exit strategies have to be determined as an equilibrium of both ￿rms
competing to monopolize the market. We already studied their exit decisions, when ￿rm
2 is at low, but ￿rm 1 is at high capacity, when both ￿rms are at high capacity, or when
one of them is a monopolist. We will now generalize the exit equilibrium considerations
to any state (qi;q￿i): This includes the states studied before just as well as the situation
when only ￿rm 1 or both ￿rms operate at low capacity.12
Given that ￿rm i expects to exit ￿rst in state (qi;q￿i); ￿rm i will use the value-matching







! = 0 (31)
12Pure exit decisions have been studied by Lambrecht (2001) and Murto (2004) in more detail. Essen-
tially, their analysis carries over, so we can be relatively brief.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 26
Figure 8: Construction of Pind;i
qi;q￿i
to determine its own exit price-trigger. Firm i can ignore the exit price of the competitor
once it expects to leave ￿rst. Being the ￿rst to exit is worse than being the second and
thus, ￿rm i will never make an e⁄ort meeting the constraint that its exit-price trigger
must be larger than ￿rm ￿i￿ s exit price. Hence, the exit price-trigger that is determined
according to conditions (31) is myopic and will be denoted by P
m_exit;i
qi;q￿i :
If ￿rm i expects to leave second in state (qi;q￿i), q￿i 6= 0; its value function is locally
independent from its own exit price-trigger P
exit;i
qi;q￿i. Only being second to leave matters.
Thus, ￿rm i is indi⁄erent about the level of its own exit price-trigger on the margin. There-
fore, there are always multiple equilibria which only di⁄er with respect to the (virtual)
exit price-trigger of the ￿rm which exits second.
However, which ￿rm actually exits second we still need to determine. Here, the limited
liability constraint of De￿nition 2 is crucial. Denote by P
ind;i
qi;q￿i the largest exit-price-trigger
￿rm i can use, so that the limited liability constraint (in De￿nition 2) of ￿rm ￿i holds
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￿rm -i prefers to exit
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
(32)
If ￿rm i chooses an exit price trigger below P
ind;i
qi;q￿i, ￿rm ￿i cannot credibly threaten to
stay longer than ￿rm i; because the limited liability constraint would become binding
otherwise, see ￿gure 8.
Thus, ￿rm ￿i leaving at the myopic price trigger and the other ￿rm choosing an exit
price-trigger smaller than P
ind;i
qi;q￿i will be an equilibrium if P
ind;i
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￿rm ￿i would immediately exit in state (q￿i;0) at any price below P
exit;￿i




q￿i;0 the limited liability constraint de￿nitely binds for ￿rm ￿i: The same
argument also implies that ￿rm i cannot threaten to exit below ￿￿1
qi+q￿i;qiP
exit;i
qi;0 : This time,






is necessary to make P
ind;i
qi;q￿i a credible threat.
The following proposition describes all equilibria of the exit-game. What type the
equilibrium actually attains, depends on the parameters of the environment.
Proposition 9 (a) Suppose that for ￿rm i the myopic exit price-trigger P
m_exit;i
qi;q￿i ; ob-
tained from (31); is smaller than P
ind;i
qi;q￿i: Then the only equilibrium of the (qi;q￿i)
stage is that ￿rm ￿i chooses P
m_exit;￿i
q￿i;qi and ￿rm i chooses a price-trigger lower than












= ;; then ￿rm i chooses its myopic exit price-trigger
P
m_exit;i


























and ￿rm ￿i choosing P
m_exit;￿i
q￿i;qi is an
equilibrium of the (qi;q￿i) stage, but only if this yields no incentive for ￿rm
￿i to invest predatorily.
(d) If in any possible equilibrium given in (c) some ￿rm has an incentive to invest preda-
torily, then both ￿rms preempt on predatory investment.
Proof. See appendix.
A few explanatory remarks that give an idea of the proof and reasoning of this propo-
sition seem appropriate: The idea behind (a) can be summarized relatively simple. Even
if ￿rm i plans to leave ￿rst, it will choose P
m_exit;i
qi;q￿i and consequently forces ￿rm -i to
leave ￿rst. Hence i can only exit second. This line of argument is discussed in detail in
Lambrecht (2001).
Case (b) has already been analyzed to the most extent. More interesting is (c). Firstly,
it gives rise to the problem of equilibria that are even non-unique in the sequence of exit.13
It may be the case that both ￿rms can force the other ￿rm to leave ￿rst. In the numerical
analysis we tackle this problem by assuming that the ￿rm with the larger P
ind;i
qi;q￿i is selected
as the one who leaves second.14
13As explained before, equilibria always are non-unique in the exit-price of the ￿rm leaving second.
These exit price-triggers are only e⁄ective out of equilibrium.
14This selection can be motivated by the following idea: Suppose ￿rm ￿i chooses an exit price-trigger
marginally larger than P
ind;i
qi;q￿i: Is the choice of P
ind;i




Conversely, this rule can be interpreted as a notion of conservativeness in the following sense: Suppose
the shareholders of ￿rm i imagine the worst case, i.e. ￿rm ￿i defaults just one logical second before i
0s
(proposed) trigger price is reached. Then only if the proposed exit price trigger is larger than the ownThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 28
Secondly, under a credible threat of predation, ￿rm i can never expect to leave second
and monopolize the market. Thus, ￿rm ￿i will choose an exit price trigger below P
ind;￿i
q￿i;qi
(if this is possible) and exit second. Firm i planing to leave ￿rst may or may not prevent
the predatory investment. Whether predatory investment still occurs is determined as
outlined before.
5 Numerical Examples
On the basis of the theoretical discussion in the last sections we can calculate the equilib-
rium for any given parameter constellation numerically. This section now presents some
examples based on some variations in parameter values. Table 1 contains the values for
the non ￿rm-speci￿c parameters. In all calculations an isoelastic inverse demand function
is used. Three cases are considered, in two of them investment costs are homogeneous, in
the other one investment costs di⁄er among ￿rms.
Table 1: General Parameter Values




Tables 2 and 3 report the results for these three cases. First of all, from these ex-
amples we see that investment price-triggers for the duopoly and the monopoly di⁄er
signi￿cantly.15
For the follower, this is just the standard result of (Cournot) competition￿ the residual
demand is less elastic. For the preemption threshold of the leader, the low price-trigger is
a result of strong ￿rst-mover advantages of the Stackelberg-leader. The usual ￿rst-mover
advantages are ampli￿ed in the presence of predatory behavior and / or a reversed order
of exit upon investment.16 These additional ￿rst-mover advantages can be very strong
which can be seen by comparing the price-triggers with the "naive" or "Marshallian"
net-present-value price trigger for investment. This naive price trigger can be calculated
indi⁄erence price trigger, i has no incentive to exit before.
Another motivation for this rule would be that ￿rms step by step and sequentially undercut each other￿ s
exit price-triggers before the actual game commences.
15This is also true for the trigger values of Y , which can be obtained by rescaling the price triggers by
1:86607 for the leader and 1:95912 for the follower, setting D(q) = 1:
16The e⁄ect of the reversed order of exit can also be seen by comparing the follower investment price-
triggers: For ￿rm 1 investment is more valuable as follower compared to ￿rm 2. It invests earlier to become










In the three cases, the price triggers are 8.2, 7.6, and 10.9 respectively assuming the other
￿rm never invests (rule 1). If one assumes the other ￿rm invests at t = 0 unless ￿rm
i invests (rule 2), then the net-present-value rule yields a price trigger of 4.5 in case A,
which is only slightly below the equilibrium investment-price trigger of ￿rm 1.
The ￿ true￿naive net-present-value rule investment-price trigger uses the equilibrium
behavior of ￿rm 2 and hence falls in between the two extremes. Therefore, the equilibrium
investment threshold price trigger is extremely close to or lower than this "naive" price
trigger. Hence, we can conclude that the gains from waiting are completely outweighed
in some cases by the threat of being forced to exit ￿rst. This strong strategic value of
investment is present in all three exemplary cases.
The main di⁄erences (in the parameters) between cases A, B, and C may be summa-
rized as follows:
Case A Firm 1 has lower leverage before and after investment.
Case B Firm 1 has a higher leverage before, but lower leverage after investment.
Case C The size of the investment projects di⁄ers between Firm 1 and 2.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes of the three cases (see tables 2 and 3) shows that
the ￿rm with the higher initial, the ￿rm with the higher post-investment leverage, and the
￿rm with the lower leverage in both states can prey in equilibrium. Therefore, interpreting
the overhead costs as debt-service, our model includes not only the cases studied by Busse
(2001) but also cases in which the ￿nancially healthier ￿rm preys. Figure 9 shows the ￿i
functions for both ￿rms corresponding to Case A. Recall, these functions represent the
gain of becoming the leader.
Table 4 reports the e⁄ects of a change in the ￿xed costs of ￿rm 1 (relative to Case
A). When investment does not change the ordering of exit price triggers the e⁄ect of ￿xed
costs on investment-price triggers is rather minor. As ￿rm 1 becomes leader in equilibrium,
investment in duopoly is delayed by an intermediate increase in ￿xed costs.
However, if both ￿rms become more similar, overhead costs starkly in￿ uence invest-
ment decisions. If ￿rm 2 can expect that ￿rm 1 leaves the market ￿rst when ￿rm 2
becomes the leader then ￿rst-mover advantages become very strong. As we have seen, the
￿rst-mover advantages can be strong enough to induce ￿rm 1 to invest below the simple
net-present-value price trigger in equilibrium.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 30
Table 2: Case A,B: ￿ = 0:9
Firm 1 (A) Firm 1 (B) Firm 2
Production before Investment 18 17.9 18
Production after Investment 20 20 20
Investment-Costs 171.43 171.43 171.43
Fixed-Costs [Overhead] 49.9 49.9 50
MONOPOLY
Exit-Price Trigger after investment 0.4496 0.4496 0.4505
Exit-Price Trigger before investment 0.4980 0.4980 0.4990
Investment-Price Trigger 99.844 95.337 99.844
DUOPOLY
Both Invested, Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits Firm 2 exits 0.45049
Firm 1 Follower: Exit-Price Trigger 0.4867 0.4888 Firm 1 exits
Firm 1 Follower: Investment-Price Trigger 15.872 15.061 Firm 1 inv.
Firm 2 Follower: Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits Firm 2 exits 0.4881
Firm 2 Follower: Investment-Price Trigger Firm 2 inv. Firm 2 inv. 17.48
Preemption Threshold Non-Predatory Investment 4.57881 4.36741 4.895 (4.873)
Unilateral Incentive to Predatorily Invest as Leader No No Yes
Firm 1: Predatory Investment-Price Trigger 0.611624 0.6206 Firm 1 inv.
Table 3: Case C: ￿ = 0:8
Firm 1 Firm 2
Production before Investment 17 18
Production after Investment 21 20
Investment-Costs 228.57 171.43
Investment-Costs per unit 57.14 85.72
Fixed-Costs [Overhead] 70 70
MONOPOLY
Exit-Price Trigger after investment 0.601 0.631
Exit-Price Trigger before investment 0.7296 0.695
Investment-Price Trigger 34.75 49.77
DUOPOLY
Both Invested, Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits 0.631
Firm 1 Follower: Exit-Price Trigger 0.693 Firm 1 exits
Firm 1 Follower: Investment-Price Trigger 9.293 Firm 1 inv.
Firm 2 Follower: Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits 0.680
Firm 2 Follower: Investment-Price Trigger Firm 2 inv. 15.924
Preemption Threshold Non-Predatory Investment 3.579 3.109
Unilateral Incentive to Predatorily Invest as Leader No Yes
Firm 1: Predatory Investment-Price Trigger Firm 2 inv. 0.786The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 31












49.9￿ 99.8436 15.8715 4.57881 4.89525
49 99.8422 17.2948 6.0871 6.52665
48 99.8407 17.2942 6.08645 6.52679
47 99.8392 17.2935 6.08581 6.52694
40 99.8294 17.2894 6.08161 6.5279
35 99.8232 17.2868 6.07892 6.52851
￿ Firm 1 exits ￿rst as follower and also predatorily invests as leader.
Figure 9: Gain, ￿i; from becoming the leader, Case A
Although only results for ￿rms that are relatively symmetric are reported, solutions
have been calculated for cases that are more asymmetric in production or investment costs.
Qualitatively, the results do not change much moving to asymmetric cases; only predatory
outcomes become more likely, i.e. we obtain predatory equilibria also for cases with a
greater di⁄erence in ￿xed costs or less pronounced reactions in price. Generally speaking,
predatory outcomes are likely if ￿rm 1 is small compared to ￿rm 2 and both have large
overhead costs.
6 Conclusions
In this paper the analysis of real options in duopoly has been extended to allow for
simultaneous irreversible investment and exit decisions. The duopoly has been modelled
in continuous time, and ￿rms could default on their obligations at no costs.
We have found that allowing for endogenous exit decisions alters the strategic situa-
tion signi￿cantly. Firms may invest not because investment is fundamentally pro￿table,
but because this makes the exit of the competitor more likely ("predatory investment").
Therefore, in the model presented ￿xed costs have a negative strategic e⁄ect. This may
for example explain why companies are willing to spend much lump-sum money and e⁄ort
to cut back on overhead costs.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 32
However, the ￿xed costs are found to have a discontinuous e⁄ect on investment in-
centives. For moderate costs, investment tends to decrease when ￿xed costs increase.
However, if cost levels get large enough, investment-incentives become very strong. Then
both ￿rms seek to become the leader and subsequently monopolize the market as soon as
revenues drop due to adverse shocks to aggregate demand.
This reasoning gives an explanation for predatory behavior in a dynamic setting, but
is neither relying on asymmetric information among competitors nor on learning-curve or
network e⁄ects. The numerical examples show that in equilibrium both, the ￿rm with the
larger and the ￿rm with the smaller overhead, may invest predatorily. Moreover, we have
found that the outlined strategic incentive can have a substantial in￿ uence also for invest-
ment not directly aimed at crowding out the competitor. The strategic motive may even
completely o⁄set the value of waiting. Then, in equilibrium the ￿rst ￿rm times investment
as if it would follow a "naive" net-present value rule for investment. Hence, the interac-
tion of exit and investment decisions becomes economicly important when irreversibility
of decisions is taken into account.
The irreversibility framework also partly shields our model of predatory investment
against the usual critique that a predator could just acquire its competitor. Whether or
not acquisition is a possible alternative depends on the kind of ￿xed costs that drive the
competitor into exit. If, for example, the ￿xed costs come in the form of ￿nancial obliga-
tions, then the remaining ￿rm may not necessarily be able to default on them separately
after the acquisition. Consequently, buying the ￿rm means loosing one exit option and
capacity cannot be reduced saving on ￿xed costs. Yet, aggregate capacity reduction is
exactly the reason for predatory investment. In such a case, the predator may prefer to
actually spend investment costs over the acquisition of its competitor.
For further research several extensions can be made: First of all, overhead-costs may
be chosen endogenously. Moreover, collusive behavior could be studied. Other possible
extensions include market entry and technological choice. Moreover, welfare issues and
issues of competition policy have not been analyzed.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 33
7 Appendix
In the following appendix, we ￿rst derive the functional form of the value function used
in our model. Thereafter, the proofs which were omitted in the main text are presented.
7.1 Deriving the value functions
The expected capital gain is calculated treating Vi(P;qi;q￿i) as an asset value and using














This expected capital gain plus the dividend, qiP ￿bi; must be equal to the normal return








+ qiP ￿ bi (36)








The complementary solution as in (6) involves terms in the form of P￿; for each solution









￿ ￿ = 0 (38)





￿ + ai1(qi;q￿i)P￿1 + ai2(qi;q￿i)P￿2. (39)
7.2 Proofs of the propositions of the main text
7.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2
For notational convenience, we introduce some short-hand notation. We denote by ￿1 :=
￿q1+q2;q1; by ￿2 := ￿q1+q2;q2;and by r :=
q1b2
q2b1 . Closely related to r is the ratio of relative
￿xed costs, l2





Lemma 4 Under the assumptions of our model and with g as in the main text
g ￿ h := (￿1)






holds for all ￿1 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
￿(1￿￿2)
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Proof. We have 1 ￿ ￿
￿(1￿￿2)























￿ ￿2 (￿1 ￿ 1)r1￿￿2 = g (￿2):






































l1 > 1. Now, note that h(1) = 1 which completes the proof.
Lemma 5 For any P
exit;2





q2;0 > 0 value of ￿rm 1 is
positive in state (￿ q1; ￿ q2).
Proof. The later ￿rm 2 exits, the lower will be ￿rm 1￿ s value, since ￿rm 1 must wait
longer to monopolize the market. Hence, we only need to check, whether ￿rm 1￿ s value










q1;0 : This is the
lowest price at which ￿rm 2 would not obtain negative value if ￿rm 1 leaves at ￿rm 2￿ s
exit price-trigger. Expecting that ￿rm 1 leaves second, the corresponding value matching














































￿ q1 for P
exit;1























































































































Substitution ￿ back in our general formulation of ￿rm 1￿ s value function, we obtain for

























This is of the same form as V: Ignoring for the moment that V changes its form at P
exit;1
q1;0 ;
we rewrite H as




















q1;0 ; ￿ q1;0
￿
= 0:
Moreover, we know h ￿ 1 from the above Lemma. Hence, H (P) ￿ 0 follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that under the proposed equilibrium strategy
￿rm 2 never becomes a monopolist. Therefore, only the actual price and not the quantity
of the competitor matter for ￿rm 2. Thus, ￿rm 2 behaves myopically. Therefore, the value
of ￿rm 2 under the proposed strategy is zero at P
exit;2
q1;q2 ; which then is indeed the optimal
trigger price.
Secondly, we have to show that ￿rm 2 cannot pro￿tably choose an exit price trigger smaller
than P
exit;1
q1;q2 : Suppose ￿rm 2 chooses a lower price trigger. Then ￿rm 2 becomes monopolist
after ￿rm 1 exits. However, the price after ￿rm 1 has left the market is still below ￿rm
2·s monopoly exit price-trigger, and hence the value associated with this strategy must
be negative. Hence, ￿rm 2 has no incentive to deviate.
Firm 1 also has no incentive to exit at a price di⁄erent to P
exit;1
q1;q2 : If ￿rm 2 chooses P
exit;2
q2;q1 ;
all price triggers below P
exit;2
q2;q1 yield the same payo⁄ given P. According to Lemmas 4 and
5 this payo⁄ is positive and larger than the value of the ￿rm that leaves ￿rst. So for ￿rm
1, leaving second is credible and pro￿table.
Last, we need to show, that there can be no other equilibrium in which ￿rm 1 exits second:
If ￿rm 1 chooses an price-trigger larger than ￿q1+q2;q2
￿1P
exit;2
q2;0 , ￿rm 2 can pro￿tably











is non-empty follows straightforward from
assumption 1, the assumption on l1
l2.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 36
7.2.2 Proofs of Proposition 3 to 6 and Lemma 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 3. Investment causes no continuous costs but only a lump
sum payment. Thus, earnings after investment are strictly larger than before investment.
Because of this, ￿rm-value at low capacity is strictly smaller than it is at high capacity.
Therefore at low capacity, ￿rm 2 must leave before P
exit;2
q2;0 has been reached￿ both, in
duopoly and monopoly. Otherwise its value would become negative before exit, see ￿gure
3. Due to the same reasoning as in proposition 2, ￿rm 2 can again not credibly threaten
to exit second. Hence, we obtain P
exit;2
q
2;￿ q1 > P
exit;2
￿ q2;￿ q1 = P
exit;2
￿ q2;0 :
As before, this leads to myopic behavior of ￿rm 2, so that P
exit;2
q











Proof of Lemma 1. (a) Potential investment of ￿rm 1 decreases the value of ￿rm 2.
In monopoly or in state (￿ qi; ￿ q￿i) there is no such potential investment of a competitor. In
both cases, at P
exit;2






prices are as low as P
exit;2
q2;0 ; the potential investment will force ￿rm-value to be negative.
Therefore, the stated inequality must hold.
(b) Upon investment of ￿rm 1, prices drop by factor ￿q
1+q2;q1+q2: Therefore, if ￿rm 1




￿ q2;￿ q1 ￿rm 2 would immediately leave and obtain zero
value. However, potential investment decreases the value of ￿rm 2 only by the expected
value of the loss upon investment. This is less than the drop in value caused by actual




￿ q2;￿ q1 must be positive and the stated
inequality follows.
Proof of Lemma 2. If ￿rm 2 exits ￿rst, e V1(P;q
1;q2) exhibits a kink. Due to Lemma
1, this kink must be at a smaller P than the kink in V1(￿q
1+q2;q1+q2P;q1;q2): De￿ne the
continuous function
f(P) := e V1(P;q


















x11P + x12P￿2 + C if ￿q1+q2;q1+q2P < P
exit;2
q2;0





f (P) = x31P + x32P￿2: (46)
Hence, f must be either concave or convex on each subset, but is possibly concave or
convex on both subsets. Consequently f(P) = 0 can have at most four solutions.
By assumption 2(a), after investment a company pro￿ts stronger from a demand-increase,
so lim
P!+1
f(P) = ￿1: Moreover, neglect for the moment the change in the functionalThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 37


















-prices. As e V1(P;q
1;q2) ￿ 0 by construction, and V1(￿￿1
q1+q2;q1P
exit;1
￿ q1;0 ;q1;q2) =





￿ q1;0 ) > 0. Therefore, the number of solutions
to f(P) = 0 must be odd on the set of price-levels that are larger than the monopoly exit-













is subset of this set. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. (a) First note that V1 (P; ￿ q1; ￿ q2) is convex (and decreasing
at P = P
exit;2
q2;0 ), so that @V1























































(b) If ￿rm 1 exits ￿rst when not equipped with an investment option, it will behave my-






q1;0 : Comparing this exit price with ￿￿1
q1+q2;q1+q2Pmin; where










sures that ￿rm 1 will not exit at a price larger than ￿￿1
q1+q2;q1+q2Pmin: Thus, at C1 =






both functions are tangentially. Increas-
ing C1 by some small amount yields multiple solutions to (21).










































q2;0 except for one point P0(see ￿gure ??). At this point




q2;0 ; which is ruled out by
the assumption on the derivatives.
















Now take costs to be equal to C0 + "; " > 0: Assuming that there is only one price
trigger for investment Pinv, will lead to a contradiction: For this trigger P0 ￿ Pinv holds.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 38
Figure 10: Loss in value from a single trigger



















































Both inequalities follow from (47) (and ￿(Pinv) ￿ ￿ (P0) ): Thus, a marginal change in
costs would lead to a non-marginal drop in value, since the last integral does not depend
on ": However, if ￿rm 1 uses a system of two price-triggers of investment depending on ";
the value drop is only marginal and hence for " small enough two price-triggers must be
optimal.
Proof of Proposition 5. If ￿￿ q1+￿ q2;￿ q1 ! 1; we have g ! 1 and ￿rm 1 does not
gain from ￿rm 2 leaving. Moreover, the value of ￿rm 1 as a monopolist and its value as a
duopolist converge. Therefore, ￿rm 1 cannot gain anything from ￿rm 2 leaving.
If demand is not completely inelastic, ￿rm 1￿ s value at the exit price of ￿rm 2 is bounded.
Now suppose the costs of investment exceed this value. Then there can be no solution





. Moreover, the number of solutions to





the left hand side of (21) is larger than the right
hand side, while for P ! 1 the reverse holds true. So the ￿rst and the last time both
functions cross, the value function at low capacity crosses from above. Hence, the number
of solutions is odd (V is continuous). However, from Lemma 2 we now know there can beThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 39
at most two solutions. Thus, both value functions can only cross once.
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose it is optimal for ￿rm i to invest at a price P0




q￿i;￿ qi . Then the only cost of a marginal delay, i.e.
a marginal decrease in the predatory investment price trigger, is the expected foregone





















i;q￿ig is the time of investment of ￿rm i: Both ￿0 and ￿1 are stochastic variables (stopping
times). Note that this derivative gets larger, the larger X is: While the change in ￿0
remains the same, the integrand increases. The time of the competitor leaving, ￿1; is
unchanged by altering the predatory investment price-trigger X; yet, only as long as X is

















To be optimal, at P0 marginal gain and marginal loss from waiting must be equal. So
L(P0) = G(P0) needs to hold. But then, at any price P00strictly larger than P0 ￿rm i
would prefer to have invested earlier, as L(P00) > G(P00) = G(P0): Therefore, P0 can
only be a locally optimal investment price trigger if ￿rm i invests at all prices larger than





q￿i;￿ qi the exit time of the competitor, ￿1; also changes









q2;0 is the only candidate for a predatory
investment price-trigger.
7.2.3 Proof of Lemma 3











Proof. First note that ￿i(P) has the stated functional form since it is a di⁄erence of
functions of the type given in (5) (which are analytic on M): It is clear that the follower￿ s
￿rm value must be a convex function. Moreover, the leader·s value decreases by the poten-
tial entry of the follower, therefore x2 < 0: Sales are increased by investment; this implies
x1 > 0. Continuity follows from the value-matching conditionsThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 40
Lemma 7 Let f(P) = x0 + x1P + x2P￿1 + x3P￿2; P > 0 and x1 > 0; x2 < 0; then f
has at most three roots. Moreover, if at P0 f(P0) > 0; there can only be two roots of f for
P < P0:
Proof. We have to consider two cases:
Case 1: x3 ￿ 0; then f is concave and therefore has at most two roots.
Case 2: x3 > 0. Firstly, note that the second derivative changes its sign at most once:
Suppose f00(P￿) = P￿￿2 ￿
￿1 (￿1 ￿ 1)x2P￿￿1 + ￿2 (￿2 ￿ 1)x3P￿￿2
￿
= 0: Then
f000 (P￿) = ￿2P￿￿3
h




￿1 (￿1 ￿ 1)￿1x2P￿￿1 + ￿2 (￿2 ￿ 1)￿2x3P￿￿2
i
. (50)
However, the ￿rst term equals ￿2
f00(P￿)
P￿ and thus, is zero and therefore:










] < 0 . (51)
This implies that the second derivative changes its sign at most once.
Therefore, the turning point P￿ divides f in a convex and a concave part. If f (P￿) < 0,
then on the concave part of f; i.e. P > P￿; there may be two roots. Since f (P￿) < 0
function f crosses 0 from above at any P < P￿; such that f (P) = 0; so that f0 (P) must
be negative. Yet, f is convex on this subset and so there can be no additional roots to this
third one. The case f (P￿) ￿ 0 follows analogously.
Proof of Lemma 3. (a) follows straightforward from the last two Lemmata.
(b) At Pi ￿rm i invests as follower, therefore
Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP;qi;q￿i) = Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP;qi;q￿i) ￿ C 8P ￿ Pi: (52)
This implies ￿i(P) > 0 if Pi ￿ P < P￿i and ￿i(P￿i) = 0; since sales of the leader are
larger before the follower has invested and
Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP￿i;qi;q￿i) ￿ C = Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP￿i;qi;q￿i) ￿ C: (53)
(c) At prices larger than P￿i ￿rm ￿i invests as follower, therefore ￿rm i can only trigger
joint investment and
8P ￿ P￿i : Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP;qi;q￿i) ￿ C = Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP;qi;q￿i) ￿ C. (54)
As long as P < Pi; it is not pro￿table for ￿rm i to invest as follower and obtain
Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP;qi;q￿i)￿C: Hence, the right-hand term must be smaller than the value
of i being the follower when P < Pi.
(d) ￿i(max
j=1;2







< 0 in case (c). De￿ne f (P) as stated in Lemma 7. Now supposeThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 41
that ￿rm i exits at Pi ￿ P￿i, then ￿i(P) > f (P) for P < Pi; since the value of ￿rm i
as follower is a convex function with derivative zero at Pi: Therefore, for ￿i(P) to have
an additional root, f(P) must have an additional root, too. However, due to Lemma 7,
f (P) cannot have that additional root.
If ￿rm i invests predatorily at Pi; then for all min
j=1;2
fPjg < P < max
j=1;2
fPjg
￿i(P) = Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP;qi;q￿i) ￿ Vi(￿qi+q￿i;qi+q￿iP;qi;q￿i) > 0 (55)
because the sales of the follower are lower, and ￿rm ￿i exits later.
7.2.4 Proofs of Proposition 7 to 9
Proof of Proposition 7. First note that at P = P
inv;L
qL;q￿L ￿rm L indeed prefers to be
the leader, because ￿i(P) > 0: Moreover because of the assumption on the valuation for
collusion we have a preemption game for non-predatory investment: Suppose ￿ denotes
the stopping-time associated with the optimal investment-price trigger of ￿rm i: Then ￿rm
￿i has an incentive to invest at time ￿ ￿ ￿; as long as the price is above its preemption




pre ] ￿rm ￿L prefers to be the follower,
while at P
inv;L
qL;q￿L ￿rm L pro￿table invests.
Proof of Proposition 8. (a) Suppose ￿rm i wishes to invest at a price P0 < P
pred;￿i
pre :
De￿ne ￿ to be the corresponding stopping time. Then ￿rm ￿i would have an incentive
to preempt and invest at a smaller price at time ￿ ￿ ". Therefore, investing predatorily
below P
pred;￿i





pre ￿rm ￿i wishes to become follower and will therefore not preempt. Moreover,
at prices below P
pred;i
pre ￿rm i wishes to become leader, so that the solution described is










pre and ￿rm ￿j has a unilateral
incentive to invest at a price P0 from this interval, this establishes a credible threat of ￿rm
￿j investing at P0. Thus, the ￿rms wish to preempt until P
pred;i
pre is reached. At this price
￿rm i is indi⁄erent between becoming leader or follower. As investment-price trigger,
￿rm ￿i will choose its unconstrained optimal predatory investment-price trigger (if this is
possible). If the constraint binds, P
pred;i
pre is chosen as investment price-trigger.




pre ] cannot be renegotiation-




pre ]: Then, since neither ￿rm




pre ]; both ￿rms would
￿nd it pro￿table to renegotiate and sign an incentive compatible contract that investment
should be carried out at the proposed price-triggers for predatory and non-predatory
investment.
The result for predatory investment follows from the same line of argument.The Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 42
Proof of Proposition 9. (a) Firm value is increasing in the exit price of the com-
petitor. If undercutting the price-trigger of ￿rm i is not credible even when i chooses the










= ; implies that leaving second always yields positive eq-
uity value for all credible exit price triggers of the competitor i: Therefore, in this case






q￿i;0 ; the interval can never be empty for both ￿rms.
(c) This has been already mostly discussed in the main text. It remains to be mentioned
that if ￿rm ￿i invests predatorily, this decreases value below the value obtained by be-
having myopically, since the competitor will only invest predatorily (if not preempting) if
she expects to leave second after investment.
(d) See main text.
7.3 Construction of the collusive value
Once the price has reached the price-trigger at which the follower invests, but the leader has
not invested yet, both ￿rms can only invest simultaneously. For simultaneous investment,
we need to distinguish two cases. In the ￿rst case, simultaneous investment decreases
revenues of both ￿rms, and in the other case investment increases revenues for at least
one ￿rm.
In the former case, both ￿rms will rather abstain from investing at all, than to invest
simultaneously. In the latter case, we need to determine the investment price-trigger at
which each of the ￿rms prefers to invest simultaneously. If simultaneous investment only
increases revenues for one ￿rm, the other ￿rm will simply set the "collusive investment
price-trigger" to in￿nity and ai1 = 0:



























































In this calculation the value matching conditions for exit have to be taken into account. If
￿rm i expects to leave ￿rst this is Vi(P
exit;i
qi;q￿i;qi;q￿i) = 0; and the value matching condition
becomes the following, if ￿rm i expects to leave second:
Vi(Pexit;￿i




Now any price-trigger is a candidate for collusive investment that falls between the






-prices, and theThe Other Side of Limited Liability:Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing 43
lowest of the preferred collusive price-triggers. The upper bound of this interval is the
pareto-optimal equilibrium and will be re-negotiated as collusive investment price-trigger.
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